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IN RESPONSE TO A REVISIT
John M. Kuhlman*
"There's glory for you!" "I don't
know what you mean by 'glory' ",
Alice said. "I meant, 'there's
a nice knock-down argument for
you!'" "But 'Glory' doesn't mean
'a nice knock-down argument,"'
Alice objected. "When I use a
word," Humpty Dumpty said in a
rather scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean,--
neither more nor less."--
L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
In an anti-trust case, for better or for worse-and, one is inclined
to say, until death do they part-lawyers and economists represent a
peculiar amalgamation of talent. The lawyers are representative of the
legal institutions and rules within which and by which the issues are
litigated. The economists are representative of the economic issues as
well as the basic intellectual discipline which is used to analyze and
rationalize those same issues. It is essential, then, that both learn
something of the other discipline. The economist must appreciate the
legal institutions and the rules within which the lawyer and the court
function. And the lawyer must develop some understanding of the
discipline of economics as well as the framework within which the
economist operates. To these ends, it is imperative that the dialogue
between the two professions be continued.
Over the past several years, Mr. Luther McKinney and I have car-
ried on such a dialogue-as lawyer and economist on opposing sides
in an antitrust case, as contributors to professional journals, and as
postprandial speakers. This dialogue has certainly contributed to my
appreciation and understanding of the law and, I hope, has made
some contribution to Mr. McKinney's understanding of economics.
But, more than that, I hope that those who have participated as
* Professor of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia.
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spectators in this dialogue have also gained some insight into one or
the other of the two disciplines.
I am afraid that some of the differences between Mr. McKinney
and myself may be semantic in nature. This arises from the fact
that economists are prone to use common words in ways that are un-
common to the layman or non-economist. Further, the economist
has been trained to speak in as precise a way as possible. But let me
explain two such instances.
Mr. McKinney contends that I confuse the two issues in an anti-
trust case: (1) the issue of the existence or non-existence of a con-
spiracy and (2) the issue of damage estimation.' I very carefully
pointed out when referring to the estimation of damages that I was
speaking to the basic economic issue rather than the basic legal issue.
It is in regard to the basic economic issue that the economist has, I
feel, a major role to play. That is, it is his task to make an estimate
of the damages resulting from the alleged violation of the antitrust
laws. It may well be that he can make a contribution to the determi-
nation of whether a conspiracy existed, and, in coming years, this
role of the economist will become increasingly important as conspira-
tors become more sophisticated and as the law makes more use of
computers. As it stands right now, however, I suspect that few
lawyers would be willing to base their case as to the existence of a
conspiracy on the analysis of the economist and nothing else. Cer-
tainly since the electrical equipment cases of the middle 1960's, the
economists' major contribution to antitrust cases has been that of esti-
mating damages.
Mr. McKinney challenges my proposition that price-fixing arrange-
ments have some effect on costs.2 He points out that Professors Left-
wich and Adelman take the position that there is "no immutable
economic rule" to the effect that such a combination will significantly
raise costs. I am confident that both Professors Leftwich and Adle-
man would agree that competition stimulates efficiency and yields a
better pattern of resource usage than does monopoly or collusive oligo-
poly, but they were not asked that question. They were asked if there
1. McKinney, Tainted Costs Revisited, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 239, 240.
2. Id. at 242.
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was an immutable economic rule that such conspiratorial combinations
would increase costs. To that very narrow and technical question,
most economists would probably answer in the negative. But if the
same economist were asked to list the benefits of competition, most
would include increased efficiency as one of their responses.
After all, competition has been our national policy since 1890. This
has been repeated and reaffirmed in congressional debate and action,
judicial decisions, and policy statements by governmental officials of
every administration. Why do we have this deep belief in the efficacy
of competition? It has never been better stated than by Judge Learned
Hand in the Alcoa decision:
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that im-
munity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry a stimulant, to in-
dustrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to coun-
teract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.3
If, indeed, economists, lawyers, and judges in any significant num-
ber believe that there is no relationship between the level of competi-
tion in an industry and the level of efficiency in that industry, then
there is a very limited basis for the antitrust laws and a national
policy of competition.
Mr. McKinney inquires whether there is anything more than a theo-
retical possibility that collusive agreements effect costs or "whether it
always follows as night the day."4 I am sure that he expects a negative
response but I am equally confident that the response has to be in the af-
firmative. In the electrical equipment price-fixing rings, there was an
allocation system in which each member firm was awarded a share of the
market. Each firm then received that portion of the market regardless
of market conditions. In periods of declining sales, the less efficient
plants produced the same percentage of a smaller total market. This
would not happen if the industry were controlled by a single firm
which operated several plants. In such an instance, the less efficient
plant would not be operated during periods of declining sales. We
can say without any doubt or equivocation, a price-fixing ring which
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. McKinney, supra note 1, at 242-43.
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allocates markets on some basis other than costs of production will
have the inevitable effect of raising the cost of production. On this
point, all economists including Professors Adelman and Leftwich will
be in hearty agreement.'
That raises the next question. Do most (or all) price-fixing agree-
ments contain market sharing provisions? There is really no way of
saying for certain, but it would appear that few firms would be willing
to enter a price-fixing agreement without some assurance thay they
would receive a portion of the industry's sales regardless of the level
of demand. This issue is sufficiently complex that the reader would do
well to read my analysis of this problem published elsewhere."
When the question of entry is introduced, a host of new issues are
raised. A price-fixing ring must do what it can to impede entry and
it might under certain circumstances even hasten the exit of some re-
sources presently in the industry. Certainly the great threat to a
price-fixing ring is an influx of resources which would so alter the
supply situation that the ring could no longer exist. If it is successful
and does impede the flow of resources into or out of the industry in
question, there can simply be no question whatsoever that the costs of
that industry are affected. A movement of resources into an industry
will, on the whole, result in increased efficiency and to the extent that
a price-fixing ring impedes this flow of resources, industry costs will be
higher. In sum, there are, it would seem, relatively few instances in
which a price-fixing ring would have no effect on the costs of pro-
duction. The reasoning does not depend upon restriction of output
and a resultant higher average cost. It results only from an allocation
of resources which is different than that which would occur under
noncollusive conditions. An industry organized as a monopoly would
actually yield superior results in terms of resource utilization than
would the same industry made up of independent firms but engaged
in price fixing.
mI.
In addition to the problems discussed above, there is also a con-
5. R. LEFTWCH, Tim PRICE SySTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 219 (3d ed.
1966).
6. Kuhlman, The Nature and Significance of Price-Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUST L.
AN EcoN. REv. 69 (1969); Kuhlman, Theoretical Issues In the Estimation of
Damages In a Private Antitrust Action, 33 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 548 (1967).
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ceptual problem. In certain theoretical market structures, economists
know the relationship between costs and price with a great deal of
certainty. In the real world some businesses have unsophisticated
pricing rules such as a 20% markup. With the exception of these
few cases, it is not all clear what the relationship is between cost and
price. As a matter of fact, there are instances in which the relation-
ship goes from price back to costs. In some instances, overhead costs
are assigned on the basis of what the product line will bear. Some
products may be assigned a great deal of the common costs of the
firm.
This means in an antitrust case, then, that the defendant firm would
not have the choice of bringing in some of its cost data and ex-
cluding other, but would, in the interest of complete analysis, be re-
quired to bring in all of its cost data including cost data pertaining to
product lines not involved in the litigation. It would have to be es-
tablished that costs were assigned without any consideration of the
existence or non-existence of a conspiracy.
Surely Mr. McKinney must have had his tongue in cheek when he
suggested that the plaintiff should assume the burden of showing that
the costs would have been in the absence of the alleged (or proven)
conspiracy. This would be a monumental, if not impossible, chore for
the accounting staff of the defendant's firm itself with its unimpeded
access to the company records.
I am sure that the contemporaneous records of the typical defendant
in a treble damage action were not made up with that action in
mind. They are, at best, a rationalization of the company's activities
for either the stockholders, the management, or the Internal Revenue
Service.
IV.
In conclusion, let me point out that the offense, alleged or otherwise,
of a price-fixing ring is the fixing of prices. The evidence of this
offense, if it is to be found, will be in the behavior of prices. That
is, the prices behaved differently than would have been the case but
for the alleged violation of the antitrust laws.
In the case of the electrical equipment trials, the price behavior was
such that no economist could possibly have explained that behavior on
the basis of anything other than a conspiracy and a breakdown of that
conspiracy. For example, in the case of power transformers, prices fell
Vol. 1972:245"1
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by a factor of one-half over a period of only a few weeks and recovered
by about the same amount in an equally short period of time. Cer-
tainly no economist is going to argue that this kind of abrupt change
in price reflects equally abrupt changes in costs.
My case can be summed up in the following brief propositions.
First, it is impossible to state what the exact relationship between price
and cost is in markets in which we find price-fixing. Second, any
action by a price-fixing ring which restricts entry, hastens exit, or al-
locates production on some basis other than efficiency will, in and of
itself, cause prices to be different than would have been the case had
the ring never existed. Third, the evidence of a price-fixing con-
spiracy and the measure of its impact must be in the prices that the
ring was alleged to have fixed and not in the relationship between the
cost and price of the member firms. And fourth, although there are
no generally accepted immutable laws to the effect that competition
lessens incentive for increased efficiency, this is a widely held belief
and it is a basis for all antitrust legislation.
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